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Seeking to have Banks Sing to the Same 
Tune: the Basel Committee Addresses 
Credit Risk–Weighted Assets 
O. Jean Strickland* 
The objective of this Comment is to provide a critical assessment 
of the recent debate about the Basel Committee for Banking 
Standards’ (“BCBS”) reforms to risk–weighted assets (“RWA”) 
calculations used to measure credit risk and to establish 
international standards for bank capital requirements.  After 
introducing the interests and objectives of both the regulators and 
the banking industry relative to this issue, the second part of this 
Comment will cover the origins of the approaches to the 
calculation of RWAs for regulatory capital requirement purposes.  
Using loans as the focus of the analysis, the third part of this 
Comment will examine the types of issues involved in standardized 
versus internal bank model based approaches to RWA 
calculations.  It will include a description of the variability 
presently occurring in the RWA calculations for loans and will 
offer explanations as to whether the variations are justified.  
Following this, the Comment will examine alternatives to the 
BCBS’ proposed calculations of RWAs for loans.  The conclusion 
will appraise possible approaches to RWA calculations for loans 
in light of technology’s continued evolution. 
                                                                                                             
 *  Senior Notes and Comments Editor, University of Miami Business Law Review; Juris 
Doctor Candidate 2018, University of Miami School of Law. Bachelor of Science in 
Economics 1986, University of Illinois at Chicago. This Comment is dedicated to my 
family and friends who support everything I undertake with a foundation of love and 
encouragement; your sincere interest in my success made this possible. A special thank 
you to Professor Caroline Bradley for invaluable feedback and advice and to the entire 
University of Miami Business Law Review editorial board for all of your hard work. All 
errors remain my own. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
“At the aggregate level, credit risk accounts for on average three 
quarters of a bank’s minimum capital requirements.”1 
 
Heads of state, bankers, and regulators worldwide continue to debate 
reforms to the international standards for determining bank capital 
requirements.  These reforms will significantly change risk–weighted 
assets’ (“RWA”) calculation, which is used to measure credit risk.2  
Working on the reforms,3 the Basel Committee members are particularly 
                                                                                                             
1 William Coen, Sec’y Gen., Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Bank for Int’l 
Settlements, Remarks at the Panel Discussion at the 2016 Annual Membership Meeting of 
the Institute of International Finance (Oct. 7, 2016), http://www.bis.org/speeches/
sp161007.htm (explaining reforms planned by the end of 2016 for banks’ regulatory capital 
standards); see generally Briefing: Upgrading the Basel Standards: From Basel III to Basel 
IV?, at 4 n.1, PE 587.361 (Jan. 18, 2017) [hereinafter Briefing 2017] (explaining that credit 
risk is the “probability that the bank does not recover the entirety of interests and 
principal”). 
2 See supra Coen, note 1; see also Boris Groendahl, Global Bank Regulator Holds Line 
Against Europe on Capital Rules, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 6, 2016, 4:00 PM), http://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-07/global-bank-regulator-holds-line-against-
europe-on-capital-rules. 
3 See Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Basel Committee membership, BANK FOR 
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, http://www.bis.org/press/p160324.htm (last updated Mar. 
24, 2016) (listing members of the committee in the About the Basel Committee section of 
the website); see Basel Comm. for Bank Supervision, Bank for Int’l Settlements, 
Implementation of Basel Standards: A Report to G20 Leaders on Implementation of The 
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concerned with the current variability in banks’ calculations and the 
deleterious effect this variability has on the credibility of international 
bank capital adequacy standards.4  Bankers generally, on the other hand, 
want maximum flexibility for creating their own models to measure credit 
risk and they want to ensure that reformed RWA calculations do not 
increase their capital requirements beyond present levels.5 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s (“BCBS”) primary 
purpose is to promote financial stability.6  Secondly, it sought to create a 
level playing field” for internationally–active banks.7  However, following 
the financial crisis at the end of 2007,8 “U.S. financial regulators in July 
2013 attempted to impose capital standards slightly more stringent than 
                                                                                                             
Basel III Regulatory Reforms 5 (Aug. 2016), http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d377.pdf 
(noting broad impact because of non–Basel Committee member jurisdictions’ increasing 
adoption—about 70 such jurisdictions intend to have final rules on key elements of Basel 
III by 2018). 
4 See Boris Groendahl & Alessandra Migliaccio, Europe Said to Threaten Revolt over 
Bank Capital–Rule Revamp, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 16, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.
com/professional/blog/europe-said-threaten-revolt-bank-capital-rule-revamp/ (“William 
Coen, secretary general of the Basel Committee, told reporters, . . . ‘We’re doing this work 
to reduce risk–weighted asset variability. And why are we doing that? To restore 
confidence in the risk–weighted capital ratios and to fully restore credibility to the capital 
adequacy framework.’”). 
5 See id.; see, e.g., Letter from Darren Hannah, Vice–President, Finance, Risk & 
Prudential Policy, Canadian Bankers Ass’n, to Secretariat, Basel Comm. on Banking 
Supervision, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, at 1 (June 23, 2016) [hereinafter Letter from 
Canadian Bankers Ass’n], https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/comments/d362/canadian
bankers.pdf (“We highlight the importance of evaluating all of the many proposed 
regulatory changes holistically to ensure that the Committee’s objective of not significantly 
increasing overall capital requirements is met.”). 
6 Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision Charter art. I ¶ 1, http://www.
bis.org/bcbs/charter.htm; see also Maziar Peihani, Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision: A Post–Crisis Analysis of Governance and Legitimacy 7 (December 2014) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The University of British Columbia), https://
open.library.ubc.ca/cIRcle/collections/ubctheses/24/items/1.0077783 (“[T]he BCBS, 
which has been central to the global governance regime of banking[,] . . . is the oldest and 
best–known global regulatory forum, and the primary global prudential standard setter.”). 
7 Secretariat of the Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Bank for Int’l Settlements, 
The New Basel Capital Accord: An Explanatory Note (Jan. 2001), 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca01.pdf (“The two principal purposes of the [Basel] Accord 
were to ensure an adequate level of capital in the international banking system and to create 
a ‘more level playing field’ in competitive terms so that banks could no longer build 
business volume without adequate capital backing.”); see also Linda Allen, The Basel 
Capital Accords and International Mortgage Markets: A Survey of the Literature, 13 
FIN. MKT., INSTS. AND INSTRUMENTS 41, 48 (2004) (“One of the goals of Basel I was to 
‘level the playing field’ and lift Japanese banks’ capital levels from their comparatively 
low levels in the pre–Basel period”). 
8 Jeffry Frieden, The Governance of International Finance, 19 ANN. REV. OF POL. SCI. 
33, 34 (2016), http://www.annualreviews.org.access.library.miami.edu/doi/pdf/10.1146/
annurev-polisci-053014-031647. 
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those of Basel III, thus improving regulatory safeguards but undermining 
the Basel premise of a level playing field for banks based in different 
countries.”9  Other countries saw the U.S. as leading the charge for higher 
capital standards for global banks through “a one–size–fits–all” 
standardized approach versus allowing banks to determine their own 
capital levels using internal models.10  Then Federal Reserve governor, 
Daniel Tarullo, even expressly stated a desire for all Basel Committee 
countries to implement standardized risk–weighted measurements for all 
internationally active banks.11  The current Trump administration, 
however, has moved to ease the regulatory burden on financial institutions 
operating in the U.S.,12 while some financial regulators and academics are 
                                                                                                             
9 Robert Kuttner, Demos, Global Governance of Capital: A Challenge for Democracy, 
DEMOS 40 (Aug. 2014), http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/Global
Governance-Kuttner_0.pdf; see also Takako Taniguchi et al., Bank–Capital Battle Makes 
Japan, EU Allies Against U.S. Push, BLOOMBERG (July 26, 2016, 4:05 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-07-26/bank-capital-fight-makes-japan-eu-
allies-against-u-s-clampdown (“The U.S. moved faster than the rest of the world after the 
2008 crisis to revamp banking oversight, often seeking stricter standards than global 
minimums set by the Basel Committee.”). 
10 Taniguchi, supra note 9; but see Patrick Henry, U.S. Regulators Hang Tough at Basel 
as Trump Rollback Looms, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 26, 2017, 4:05 PM), https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-01-27/u-s-bank-regulators-hang-tough-at-basel-
as-trump-rollback-looms (“Trump has vowed to roll back financial regulation, and . . . 
there is concern that U.S. commitment to global banking standards may dwindle on his 
watch.”). 
11 Daniel Tarullo, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Rethinking the 
Aims of Prudential Regulation, Remarks at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Bank 
Structure Conference 15 (May 8, 2014), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
speech/tarullo20140508a.pdf (“It would be best if all the Basel Committee countries 
moved together to adopt standardized risk–weighted and supervisory stress testing 
requirements for all internationally active banks.”); but see Ryan Tracy, Meet Randal 
Quarles, Trump’s Pick to Shake Up the Fed, WALL ST. J., https://www.wsj.com/
articles/meet-randal-quarles-trumps-pick-to-shake-up-the-fed-1501234201 (last updated 
July 28, 2017, 8:36 PM) (reporting that, as an expected replacement to Mr. Tarullo, who 
left in April 2017, “Mr. Quarles . . . said he would review rules about banks’ capital 
levels”). 
12 See Exec. Order No. 13772, 82 Fed. Reg. 9965 (Feb. 3, 2017) (identifying as core 
principles, inter alia, “foster[ing] economic growth and vibrant financial markets through 
more rigorous regulatory impact analysis that addresses systemic risk and market failures, 
such as moral hazard and information asymmetry,” “advanc[ing] American interests in 
international financial regulatory negotiations and meetings,” and ordering the Dep’t of the 
Treas. to report on how laws and policies promote the Core Principles); see also DEP’T OF 
THE TREAS., A FINANCIAL SYSTEM THAT CREATES ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES: BANKS AND 
CREDIT UNIONS 6–7, 13 (June 2017) (responding to Exec. Order No. 13772 and arguing 
for changes to ease financial institution regulatory burdens and increase lending so as to 
promote economic growth while ensuring financial stability, in part, by “recalibrating 
capital requirements that place an undue burden on individual loan asset classes, 
particularly for mid–sized and community financial institutions”). 
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sounding an alarm,13 leaving uncertain where U.S. capital calculations and 
requirements will ultimately fall relative to Basel III.14  On the other hand, 
European Union (“EU”) banks, representing nearly half of the world’s 
biggest banks, strongly oppose restrictions on the use of models to 
measure risk because they fear a more standardized approach will 
disproportionately increase their capital requirements.15  The current 
protests to the Basel Committee’s recommendations signals the potential 
for “a fracturing of the hard–won coordination of regulation in the wake 
of the financial crisis.”16 
This Comment will examine relevant arguments for and against 
internal model–based approaches to calculating credit RWAs using loans 
as a proxy for examples of the challenges inherent in their use.  Part II will 
explain the evolution of approaches to the calculation of RWAs for loan 
categories, which are used to establish regulatory capital requirements.  
Part III will describe examples of the variability occurring in the RWA 
                                                                                                             
13 Geoffrey Smith, Rolling Back Banking Regulations “Very Dangerous,” Says Fed 
Vice Chairman, FORTUNE (Aug. 16, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/08/16/dodd-frank-
rollback-dangerous-short-sighted-fed/ (“Federal Reserve Vice Chair Stanley Fischer has 
sounded the alarm at Republican plans to roll back regulations for the country’s largest 
banks . . . [stating] ‘I am worried that the U.S. political system may be taking us in a 
direction that is very dangerous.’”); see also Stephen Cecchetti & Kim Schoenholtz, The 
US Treasury’s Missed Opportunity, VOX: CEPR’S POLICY PORTAL (July 14, 2017), 
http://voxeu.org/article/us-treasury-s-missed-opportunity (“[A]t least when considering 
the largest banks, our conclusion is that adopting the Treasury’s recommendations would 
make the financial system less safe. And, it would do so with little prospect for boosting 
economic growth. At times, the proposals read more like a financial industry wish–list than 
a desirable and impartial balancing of the country’s needs for both a vibrant and resilient 
financial system.”). 
14 See e.g., DEP’T OF THE TREAS., supra note 12, at 12, 16 (“[F]urther emphasis should 
be given to the use of standardized approaches over advanced approaches for risk–
weighting assets to simplify the capital regime[,] . . . [and] banking agencies [should] 
carefully consider the implications for U.S. credit intermediation and systemic risk from 
the implementation in the United States of a revised standardized approach for credit risk 
under the Basel III capital framework[, and] U.S. regulators should provide clarity on how 
the U.S.–specific adoption of any new Basel standards will affect capital requirements and 
risk–weighted asset calculations for U.S. firms.”). 
15 Boris Groendahl, EU Escalates Standoff with U.S. on Global Bank Capital Rules, 
BLOOMBERG (Updated Sept. 23, 2016, 10:56 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2016-09-23/eu-opposes-key-plank-of-basel-s-global-bank-capital-rule-revamp 
(observing also that the EU is home to nearly half of the world’s biggest banks); see also 
Clive Briault, Basel Delay, KPMG: INSIGHTS (Jan. 23, 2017), https://home.
kpmg.com/xx/en/home/insights/2017/01/basel-delay-fs.html (“[T]he concern among EU 
banking supervisors [has been] that constraints on banks’ use of internal models to 
calculate capital requirements would have a disproportionately negative impact on 
European banks. European banks hold proportionately more assets – such as mortgage 
lending – on their balance sheets, for which the use of internal models produces a marked 
benefit compared with the application of standardised risk weightings.”). 
16 Groendahl, supra note 15. 
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calculations for loans presently and will review whether the variability is 
justified.  Part IV will examine alternative proposals for improving banks’ 
financial stability, including the feasibility of including other factors, and 
additional granularity, in the calculation of RWAs for loans.  Part V will 
offer concluding thoughts considering advancements in technology. 
II. EVOLUTION OF CREDIT RWA CALCULATIONS 
“[C]oordinated international action was needed to prevent future 
crises from spilling over borders.”17 
 
As interconnectedness between national economies increased, 
financial regulators in developed countries recognized that an individual 
bank failure could have significant “systemic and financial stability 
implications” across nations.18  Thus, the BCBS emerged as a global 
standard–setting body for banking supervision and prudential regulation.19  
The BCBS created the Basel Accords, which provide for home country 
banking supervisors of internationally–active banks in their jurisdiction to 
oversee implementation of the capital standards framework for these 
banking groups on a consolidated basis.20  Host country supervisors also 
have a role and “are responsible for supervision of those entities operating 
in their countries.”21  For efficiency and avoidance of regulatory arbitrage, 
host country supervisors may accept the group level capital standards work 
                                                                                                             
17 Ranjit Lall, Why Basel II Failed and Why Any Basel III is Doomed 3 (Univ. of Oxford 
Glob. Econ. Governance Programme, Working Paper No. 2009/52, 2009), http://
www.globaleconomicgovernance.org/sites/geg/files/Lall_GEG%20WP%202009_52.pdf; 
see also Peihani, supra note 6 (arguing that BCBS’ evolution has been driven by “the 
serious risks posed by profit–seeking practices” necessitating collaboration among those 
who regulate banks and financial institutions. The banks do not collaborate directly to 
create their regulatory framework.). 
18 Caroline Bradley, Financial Stability, Regulation and Politics: Risks, Uncertainties 
and the International Financial System 6–7 (Aug. 24, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with author); Lall, supra note 17, at 4–6. 
19 Melissa Boey, Regulating “Bankerspace”: Challenging the Legitimacy of the Basel 
Accords as Soft Law, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. POSTSCRIPT 74, 75–76, 87–88 (2014) (“The 
committee consists of ‘[s]enior officials responsible for banking supervision or financial 
stability issues in central banks,’ or equivalent authorities with the formal responsibility of 
supervising banking in various nations worldwide . . . . By design, the BCBS is a ‘small, 
homogeneous, and insular’ club, meant to be able to reach agreement quickly and flexibly, 
and shielded against political, executive, and legislative forces.”). 
20 Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Bank for Int’l Settlements, International 
Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework 
Comprehensive Version 219 (June 2006) [hereinafter International Convergence], 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128.pdf. 
21 Id. 
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of an internationally–active bank operating at the local level.22  Home 
country supervisors lead the coordination of the respective roles of the 
home country and host country supervisors.23 
While Basel I, which targeted internationally–active banks, was an 
initial effort by central bankers in the most developed countries to establish 
comparable and equivalent bank capital standards, jurisdictions of all sizes 
and standing across the globe, adopted the standards.24  Thus, with far–
reaching impact, Basel I set minimum capital requirements at only 8% of 
risk–weighted assets,25 without empirical studies or other support for the 
adequacy of the 8% level.26 
Nonetheless, employing the 8% standard, Basel I’s standardized 
approach for calculating risk–weighted assets assigned loans to one of four 
broad categories of risk such as: (1) Cash, loans to governments in 
specified countries–0%, (2) Loans to banks in specified countries–20%, 
(3) Residential mortgages–50%, (4) Corporate and consumer loans–
100%.27  Under this approach, banks totaled the weighted assets and 
multiplied the total by the 8% floor to determine their minimum capital 
requirement.28  With only four broad categories for assets, critics argued 
                                                                                                             
22 Id. 
23 Id.; see also Boey, supra note 19, at 78 (“[T]he focus on accountability and democratic 
legitimacy ought to be shifted from the international level back to the domestic, before 
each nation state adopts the Basel Accord into binding law. In this manner, soft law will 
permit the necessary coordination and cooperation in a rapidly developing and politically 
contentious realm by experts best placed to resolve such issues, while ensuring that no 
binding legal strength or ‘bite’ is granted until it has gone through the necessary 
constitutional and democratic review processes, as per each jurisdiction’s lawmaking 
processes.”). 
24 CHARLES GOODHART, THE BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION: A HISTORY 
OF THE EARLY YEARS 1974–1997, at 556 (2011). 
25 Lall, supra note 17, at 5; see also Risk Weighted Assets: DIY Capital, THE ECONOMIST 
(Dec. 8, 2012), http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21567958-
edifice-modern-bank-regulation-comes-under-scrutiny-diy-capital (reporting that Basel II 
adopted the idea of risk–weighted assets so that banks with the most creditworthy 
borrowers could set aside less capital than peers taking greater risks and illustrating with 
the example that a residential mortgage considered ten times safer than a person loan would 
only require 10% as much capital). 
26 Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Top–Down Bank Capital Regulation, 55 WASHBURN L.J. 
327, 350 (2016) (noting that the BCBS “never demonstrated support for setting the original 
risk based capital ratio at 8%” and stating that “[e]conomists Admati and Hellwig argue 
for levels in the 20 to 30% range,” with others favoring 20% or more as well); cf. 
GOODHART, supra note 24, at 178 (reporting that the G10 members of the BCBS 
established the 8% standard after calculations of existing ratios indicated most countries 
were at a 7–10% range). 
27 RICHARD APOSTOLIK ET AL., FOUNDATIONS OF BANKING RISK: AN OVERVIEW OF 
BANKING, BANKING RISKS, AND RISK–BASED BANKING REGULATION 68–69 (2009). 
28 See id. at 69. 
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that Basel I’s floor made it profitable for banks to take more risk.29  Under 
this framework, banks had to hold the same amount of capital for the 
highest credit–quality companies as for lower credit–quality companies.30  
Therefore, Basel I encouraged banks to make risker loans because they 
could charge more for loans to the lowest credit–quality companies 
without incurring a proportionately higher cost for capital.31 
In response to the criticism that Basel I encouraged banks to take too 
much risk and other concerns, the BCBS introduced Basel II in 2004.32  
Basel II connected capital requirements to the actual risks inherent in 
banks’ activities and assets, making capital standards more risk–sensitive.  
Banks used the ability to calculate actual risks to justify capital levels 
below the 8% floor of Basel I.33  Large and typically internationally–active 
banks invested in sophisticated risk models to determine credit risk and 
primary inputs to the capital calculation—the internal ratings–based 
(“IRB”) approach.34  Under this approach, banks were able to use their 
own history to determine borrowers’ probabilities of default (“PD”).35  
Those using the advanced IRB approach were also able to rely on their 
own inputs for maturity of the exposure, their own estimates for loss given 
default (“LGD”), and their own estimates for exposure at default (“EAD”) 
on an exposure–by–exposure basis.36 
While the actual calculations of RWAs using PD, LGD, and EAD are 
complex,37 the basic purpose of capital may be simply stated—to cover 
unexpected losses.38  The BCBS stated that “an institution is expected to 
suffer losses that exceed its level of . . . capital on average once in a 
                                                                                                             
29 See id. at 68–71. 
30 Id. at 70. 
31 Id. 
32 See id. at 71; see also DANIEL K. TARULLO, BANKING ON BASEL: THE FUTURE OF 
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REGULATION 123 & n.60 (2008). 
33 See Peihani, supra note 6 (unpublished dissertation at 123–24) (explaining from a 
regulatory capture perspective that banks obtained concessions during the Basel II process 
allowing them to reduce capital below the 8% floor). 
34 See Basel Comm. on Bank Supervision, Bank for Int’l Settlements, An Explanatory 
Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions, at 1 (July 2005) [hereinafter Basel II IRB], 
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/irbriskweight.pdf; see also 3 Andrew Yeh, James Twaddle & Mike 
Frith, Basel II: A New Capital Framework, 68 BULL. OF THE RES. BANK OF N.Z. 6 (Sept. 2005), 
https://www.rbnz.govt.nz/-/media/ReserveBank/Files/Publications/Bulletins/2005/2005sep68-
3yehtwaddlefrith.pdf. 
35 See id. at 3–4; see also TARULLO, supra note 32 at 124, fig. 4.7. 
36 Basel II IRB, supra note 34, at 1–4, 9–11; see also TARULLO, supra note 32, at 124 
fig.4.7. 
37 Vanessa Le Lesle & Sofiya Avramova, Revisiting Risk–Weighted Assets 21 (Int’l 
Monetary Fund Working Paper No. 12/90, 2012), https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/
WP/Issues/2016/12/31/Revisiting-Risk-Weighted-Assets-25807. 
38 Basel II IRB, supra note 34, at 7. 
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thousand years.”39  Accordingly, the BCBS advised banking supervisors 
to analyze whether banks are incorporating considerations of unexpected 
events in calculating their required level of capital.40  Further, the BCBS 
explained that “[t]his analysis should cover a wide range of external 
conditions and scenarios, and the sophistication of techniques and stress 
tests used should be commensurate with the bank’s activities.”41 
Still, Basel II only provided guidance regarding banks’ capital 
adequacy; regulators required no standard method for calculating a loan 
portfolio’s capital reserve.42  Also, the revised framework allowed national 
supervisors discretion for implementation into national law of “dozens of 
rules or standards,” which created further opportunity for variation in 
practice.43  As Federal Reserve governor Daniel Tarullo asserted: 
The revised [Basel II] framework was controversial even 
before it was issued.  Even as some large banks were 
reassured by trial runs of the Basel II IRB formulas 
showing that bank capital would decline, many academics 
and policy commentators—and even a few legislators—
had concluded that the whole enterprise was significantly 
deficient, if not wholly misguided.  Some US regulators 
had second thoughts as well, leading to a semi–public 
interagency struggle over the degree to which US 
implementing regulations would require more safeguards 
against capital declines than are present in the revised 
framework.  The subprime crisis of 2007 reinforced the 
case made by at least some of the skeptics and induced the 
Basel Committee to propose significant modifications to 
Basel II before it had even been fully implemented.  These 
post–2004 developments suggest the possibility that the 
revised framework will be subject, if not to continuous 
revision, then at least to continuous debate over whether 
changes are needed.44 
Thus, the BCBS began work on Basel III because some viewed Basel 
II as having lowered the capital requirements under Basel I, and as being 
                                                                                                             
39 Id. at 11. 
40 International Convergence, supra note 20, at 210. 
41 Id. 
42 Jonathan B. Dressler & Loren W. Tauer, Estimating Expected and Unexpected Losses 
for Agricultural Mortgage Portfolios, 98 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 1470, 1471 (2016) 
(referencing International Convergence, supra note 20, at 219). 
43 TARULLO, supra note 32, at 123. 
44 Id. at 10. 
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inadequate in light of the financial crisis that began in 2007.45  In 
December 2010, the BCBS issued Basel III rules with the following 
objectives: 1) to improve the quality of banks’ capital, 2) to ensure the 
amount of capital covered banks’ risk–taking activities, 3) to require banks 
to build–up a capital cushion for use in periods of stress, and 4) to establish 
global liquidity standards for banks.46   In particular, Basel III set forth a 
leverage ratio requirement, which acted as a capital floor and limited 
banks’ ability to lower their capital requirements through the use of 
internal models. 47 
Following the newer revisions of Basel III, however, the BCBS 
observed undesirable practice–based variations in banks’ calculations of 
RWAs, including differences in supervisory practices and differences 
between banks in estimates of PD and LGD assigned to the same 
borrowers.48  After its first study of the variability in RWAs in 2013, the 
BCBS announced policy options it could use to address excessive 
practice–based variations.49  Additionally, in its July 2013 report, the 
BCBS specifically said: 
Over the medium term, the Committee will examine the 
potential to further harmonise national implementation 
requirements and to put constraints on IRB parameter 
estimates.  This policy work would also benefit from 
additional top–down analyses based on better data, such 
as more granular information on the types of exposures 
                                                                                                             
45 See id. 
46 Press Release, Basel Comm. for Bank Supervision, Bank for Int’l Settlements, Basel III 
Rules Text and Results of the Quantitative Impact Study Issued by the Basel Comm. (Dec. 
16, 2010), http://www.bis.org/press/p101216.htm. 
47 Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Bank for Int’l Settlements, Basel III: A Global 
Regulatory Framework for More Resilient Banks and Banking Systems, at 2 (rev. June 
2011), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf. 
48 See Press Release, Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Bank for Int’l Settlements, 
Regulatory Consistency of Risk–Weighted Assets in the Banking Book – Report Issued by 
the Basel Committee (July 5, 2013), http://www.bis.org/press/p130705.htm (“[T]here was 
a high correlation in how banks rank a portfolio of individual borrowers. Differences exist, 
however, in the levels of estimated risk, as expressed in probability of default (PD) and 
loss–given–default (LGD), that banks assign. These differences drive the variation in risk 
weights attributable to individual bank practices, and could result in the reported capital 
ratios for some outlier banks varying by as much as 2 percentage points from a 10% risk–
based capital ratio benchmark (or 20% in relative terms) in either direction, although the 
capital ratios for most banks fall within a narrower range.”). 
49 Id. 
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within bank portfolios and information on credit risk 
mitigation.50 
After the BCBS published four consultative documents from late 2015 
to mid–2016, Secretary General William Coen reported in October 2016 
that the committee had reviewed comments on its proposals and would be 
issuing by year–end “a final package that reduces variability in risk–
weighted assets and helps restore credibility to banks’ risk–based capital 
ratios.”51  Specific comments Secretary General Coen made about the 
“package” included (1) noting that a move back toward a standardized 
approach for calculating RWAs would negate the need for floors, (2) 
suggesting that the BCBS could improve risk sensitivity within the 
standardized approach, (3) providing notice of intent to curtail the use of 
internal modeling approaches, and (4) warning that the BCBS is not 
committing to no changes in capital requirements—by clarifying, 
consistent with its position on no aggregate increase in capital, that capital 
requirements should increase for riskier exposures and decrease for lower 
risk exposures.52 
Some in the banking industry objected to limitations on the use of 
internal models, arguing that variations in RWA calculations are desirable 
to reflect real differences in risk among jurisdictions and loan portfolios.53  
Further, these proponents of maintaining the status quo point to regulatory 
                                                                                                             
50 Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Bank for Int’l Settlements, Regulatory 
Consistency Assessment Programme (RCAP): Analysis of Risk–Weighted Assets for Credit 
Risk in the Banking Book, at 9 (2013) [hereinafter Regulatory Consistency], 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs256.pdf. 
51 Coen, supra note 1; see also Press Release, Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, 
Bank for Int’l Settlements, The Chairman of the Basel Committee Reaffirms Commitment 
to Finalise Post–Crisis Basel III Reforms (Mar. 2, 2017), https://www.bis.org/
press/p170302.htm (reporting that “finalization of Basel III will take longer than originally 
expected”). 
52 Coen, supra note 1; see also Briefing 2017, supra note 1, at 7 (explaining, for 
example, that revisions in the risk–sensitivity of a standardized approach to replace IRB 
modeling for mortgages would have the consequence of increasing capital requirements 
“on [commercial and residential] mortgages with loan–to–value (LTV) ratios of more than 
0.8 or when the repayment relies on cash flows generated by the property, while decreasing 
requirements for those with low LTV ratio[s] (below 0.4)”). 
53 Comment from the European Banking Fed’n to Basel Comm. on Banking 
Supervision, Bank for Int’l Settlements, at 4 (June 24, 2016) [hereinafter European Banking 
Fed’n Comment], https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/comments/d362/europeanbanking.pdf 
(responding with (1) objection to “the use of parameter floors and the proposed restrictions 
on the use of internal model for certain portfolios”; (2) argument that variability in RWAs 
is desirable and reflective of differences in market and portfolio characteristics among 
other factors; and (3) observation that most unwarranted variation is due to differences in 
interpretation of the requirements of the IRB approach or due to choices allowed within 
the approach). 
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efforts, which will soon address any unjustified variation in RWAs, i.e., 
variations in defining default and, consequently, differences as to when 
the maintenance of more capital in recognition of such a loan’s higher risk 
is appropriate.54 
Examining the regulatory analyses of variations in the RWA 
calculations comparatively with banks’ explanations and justifications for 
the variations illuminates issues as to (1) how much harmonization is 
needed, (2) whether it is feasible to achieve accuracy in risk measurement, 
and (3) whether concerns for oversight and comparability of banks’ RWA 
calculations outweigh a presumably valid, but extremely complex, pursuit 
of accurate risk measurement. 
III. EXPLANATIONS FOR VARIABILITY IN CALCULATIONS 
“[I]f the challenges that accompany[y] complex regulation are too 
high, simpler rules may increase the efficacy of financial regulation.”55 
 
Critics of model–based regulation assert that its complexity provides 
competitive advantage to the largest banks because these banks use the 
costly and sophisticated modeling techniques to lower their capital 
requirements, providing them with capacity to increase their business 
volume.56 Smaller banks without the resources to invest in sophisticated 
models are relegated to the standardized and simpler approach for 
calculating RWAs and capital requirements.57  Thus, the largest banks, 
using the IRB approach, may gain a greater volume of business at the 
expense of smaller banks unable to invest in modeling.58 
Additionally, proponents of simplicity say that the complexity of the 
IRB approach imposes unintended societal costs.  These costs include the 
cost of the people banks must employ to support complex models, and the 
cost of more people within government to oversee banks’ use of complex 
                                                                                                             
54 Id. at 4–5 (reporting that in 2015 the European Banking Authority (“EBA”) began 
addressing the high level of variability among banks’ outcomes using the IRB approach 
with a new framework to be implemented by 2020 at the latest). 
55 Markus Behn, Rainer Haselmann & Vikrant Vig, The Limits of Model–Based 
Regulation 1, 10, 13 (European Cent. Bank, Working Paper No. 1928, 2016), 
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp1928.en.pdf?17ae15d416e9a8ff8b16bb
d3c746c471 (explaining their study is based upon the German credit register data of 1,603 
German banks, 45 of which opted for IRB, and claiming to be the first paper to demonstrate 
how banks used model–based regulation to economize their capital requirements). 
56 Id. at 8–9. 
57 Id. 
58 See id. 
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models.59  Some experts claim that increases in financial supervisors have 
significantly out–paced the number of people working in the financial 
industry.60  Others suggest that banks’ hiring of skilled talent to run the 
complex models may be an inefficient allocation of society’s resources.61 
Of even greater concern is that history demonstrates that the IRB 
approach has produced meaningfully lower capital requirements than the 
standardized approach, which some experts thought already too low.62  
Critics argue that allowing banks to create their own inputs into elaborate 
risk–weighted asset calculations results, unsurprisingly, in “gaming the 
system” or a race to zero.63  Also, the variation presently occurring in 
banks’ intricate RWA calculations aligns with the explanation that those 
who employ the best talent will find the loopholes around compliance thus 
making the models inequitable and their results incomparable.64  
Accordingly, those opposed to the IRB approach contend that regulators 
may be unable to detect the inappropriate exploitation of the models to 
lower capital requirements.65 
On the other hand, proponents of model–based regulation support 
linking bank capital to bank asset risk by explaining that “risk–sensitivity” 
in capital regulation allocates capital in an effective manner and facilitates 
“sustainable and stable growth in the economy.”66   Supporters also note 
that models for risk management provide banks with better knowledge 
about risks, and de–linking them from capital calculations discourages 
                                                                                                             
59 Andrew G. Haldane, Exec. Dir., Fin. Stability, Bank of Eng., Address at the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Atlanta: Financial Markets Conference, Constraining Discretion in Bank 
Regulation 7 (Apr. 9, 2013), http://www.bis.org/review/r130606e.pdf. 
60 Andrew G. Haldane, Exec. Dir., Fin. Stability, Bank of Eng., Remarks at the Int’l Fin. 
Law Review Dinner, Turning the Red Tape Tide (Apr. 10, 2013), http://www.
bis.org/review/r130411d.pdf. 
61 See generally ANAT ADMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG, THE BANKERS’ NEW CLOTHES: 
WHAT’S WRONG WITH BANKING AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 196 (2013). 
62 Haldane, supra note 60; see also ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra note 61, at 178 
(discussing historical support for much higher equity levels—at least 20 to 30 percent). 
63 Haldane, supra note 60; see Behn, supra note 55, at 4. 
64 Haldane, supra note 60; see Behn, supra note 55, at 4; see Lesle & Avramova, supra 
note 37, at 27–28 (noting regulatory awareness that banks “cherry pick” methodologies in 
modeling to optimize capital requirements). 
65 Behn, supra note 55, at 5 n.2, 9 n.12 (citing one study that asserts once complex rules 
are in place, the rules drive banks to accumulate assets which score favorably under the 
models thus creating systemic risk such as that which occurred with residential loans and 
their massive securitization during the recent crisis period). 
66 EUR. ECON., THE USES (AND ABUSES) OF MODELLING ADJUSTMENTS, at 8–9 (2016), 
http://www.europe-economics.com/publications/europe_economics_final_report_march_
2016.pdf; but see ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra note 61, at 108, 179, 219–22 (arguing that 
substantially higher requirements for capital would be more efficient by reducing the cost 
of equity, which should not be viewed as fixed but, rather, in relationship to risk; higher 
capital requirements would also avoid the costs associated with financial instability). 
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banks’ further investment in these tools.67  Modeling proponents also 
argue that linking banks’ own risk assessment of borrowers to capital 
allows banks to differentiate their pricing and prevents lower risk 
borrowers from seeking better pricing in the unregulated “shadow–
banking” space.68 
However, by linking bank capital with individual bank asset risk, the 
current regulations validate the inherent complexity in assessing bank 
capital in part because they are ever–evolving and require continuous re–
calibration.69  Even critics acknowledge that these complicated, risk–based 
calculations need to be performed by the banks themselves, and regulators 
must oversee each bank’s individualized calculations.70  In summary, a 
model–based approach to RWA calculations may be doomed to 
continually frustrate regulators’ capital adequacy oversight and investors’ 
capital adequacy assessments.71 
A. The Regulatory View of Risk Sensitivity and Variation in RWAs 
The BCBS declared in July 2013 that reducing the complexity of 
RWA calculations was necessary because the non–uniform and complex 
models confused stakeholders—such as banking supervisors and 
investors—when they tried to assess banks’ capital adequacy.72   It 
explained that, although linkage of regulatory models with bank risk 
management techniques reduces the opportunity for regulatory arbitrage, 
it drives excessive complexity in the capital framework as bank risk 
management techniques increase in sophistication.73  In other words, the 
need for simplicity to facilitate regulatory oversight outweighs the benefits 
of linking capital requirements with banks’ individual risk management 
practices.74  Supporting this position, the BCBS pointed out that there are 
                                                                                                             
67 EUR. ECON., supra note 66, at 9–10. 
68 See id.; but see ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra note 61, at 224–26 (arguing that it is 
possible to regulate the shadow–banking sector). 
69 Behn, supra note 55, at 4. 
70 See id. at 33; see, e.g., FED. RES. SYS., CAPITAL PLANNING AT LARGE BANK HOLDING 
COMPANIES: SUPERVISORY EXPECTATIONS AND RANGE OF CURRENT PRACTICE 1–2 (2013), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/bcreg20130819a1.pdf (explaining capital 
assessment expectations for large, complex institutions generally and including the 
requirement for firm specific assessments of risk). 
71 See Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Bank for Int’l Settlement, The Regulatory 
Framework: Balancing Risk Sensitivity, Simplicity and Comparability, at 1 (2013) 
[hereinafter Regulatory Framework], http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs258.pdf (commenting 
that pursuit of risk sensitivity has increased the complexity of RWA calculations to the 
point where there may not be an appropriate balance between the goals of risk sensitivity, 
simplicity, and comparability). 
72 Id. at 12–13. 
73 Id. at 9–10. 
74 Id. 
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possibly hundreds of models involved in determining consolidated capital 
requirements using advanced mathematics for calculations, and regulators 
are challenged to keep pace with banks’ risk management techniques.75 
Contributing to complexity and comparability challenges, some banks 
acquired exceptional treatment for RWA calculations even under the 
standardized approach.76  Further, the BCBS noted that the Basel standards 
allow significant national discretion beyond the typical supervisory 
judgments that an internal model–based approach should entail, 
exacerbating RWA variations and providing yet another challenge with 
comparing banks’ RWAs.77 
The BCBS’ July 2013 Discussion Paper, which announced the need 
for simplicity in the capital framework,78 was published the same month 
that it published its analysis of twenty–eight studies by twenty–one 
organizations addressing the variability in banks’ calculations of RWAs.79  
This analysis incorporated results from a hypothetical benchmarking 
exercise the BCBS conducted where banks provided their actual risk 
parameters for various sovereign, financial, and corporate borrowers.80  
While the benchmarking study concluded there was a high level of 
consistency in banks’ assessment of relative riskiness of obligors, it 
determined that there were undesirable differences in banks’ PD and LGD 
estimates used to calculate levels of risk.81  Noting the low–default nature 
of the sovereign and bank asset classes in particular, the BCBS said a lack 
of appropriate data may be a factor causing the estimate differences and 
RWA variability between banks.82 
Overall, the BCBS analysis found that around 75% of RWA variations 
were attributable to the corporate and retail asset classes.83  It concluded 
that while most of the RWA variation in the corporate and retail portfolios 
related to actual differences in risk versus modeling practices, the RWA 
variations remained excessive.84 
                                                                                                             
75 Id. 
76 Id. (explaining that these exceptions often exhibited differentiated jurisdictional 
attributes). 
77 Regulatory Framework, supra note 71, at 1, 18 (explaining that national discretion 
“should improve comparability and the evenness of the playing field, as the treatment of 
dissimilar risks is not forced into a ‘one size fits all’ template”; but, in practice, this can 
also impair the comparability of RWAs). 
78 Id. at 1–2. 
79 Regulatory Consistency, supra note 50, at 13 & n.23. 
80 Id. at 26. 
81 Id. at 6. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 18. 
84 See id. at 26, 46. 
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Noting that internal models, even when linked to individual risk 
management practices, should have similar conceptual foundations and 
data sources, the BCBS was critical of materially significant practiced–
based modeling variations needing resolution.85  Summarizing on–site 
discussions with banks, the BCBS commented that bank data and 
modeling choices were significant drivers of RWA variation.86  
Specifically, the BCBS identified “themes” involving a general lack of 
data for low default portfolios covered by the hypothetical exercise, 
variations in the quality of reference data used in bank estimates, and short 
timeframes associated with data reference sets indicating that these data 
sets might not be capturing downturn scenarios to be sufficiently 
conservative estimates of risk.87 
The BCBS commented that it would pursue various short–term and 
medium–term policy initiatives to reduce the practice–based variations.88  
These initiatives included: (1) enhancing bank disclosure requirements to 
improve transparency and better inform stakeholders about underlying risk 
differentiators, (2) providing more guidance to banks, e.g., relative to the 
use of external data for low–default portfolios, (3) harmonizing national 
requirements to eliminate unwarranted differences between jurisdictions, 
and (4) constraining IRB parameter estimates, including creating floors.89 
The BCBS published a second report on RWA variation in April 2016 
focused on retail and small and medium–sized enterprise (SME) loan 
portfolios, and the variability in estimates of exposure at the time of default 
(EAD) across the entire banking book.90  The qualified findings were 
based on two BCBS data collections conducted in September and October 
of 2014.91  The study determined that average PD estimates for all banks 
and portfolios aligned closely with actual default experience, and it 
reported that banks experienced fewer defaults than estimated for the 
                                                                                                             
85 See Regulatory Consistency, supra note 50, at 46 (commenting that the introduction 
of judgment resulted in greater variation); see also Regulatory Framework, supra note 71, 
at 18 (observing that regulatory and risk management models should have “similar 
conceptual foundations and data sources”). 
86 Regulatory Consistency, supra note 50, at 8 & n.19. 
87 Id. at 46. 
88 Id. at 9. 
89 Id. at 9–10. 
90 Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Bank for Int’l Settlement, Regulatory 
Consistency Assessment Programme (RCAP) Analysis of Risk–Weighted Assets for Credit 
Risk in the Banking Book, at 2 (2016) [hereinafter Regulatory Consistency 2016], 
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d363.pdf?_sm_au_=iVVk10t8St57pnZT. 
91 Id. (“Data on Retail/SME exposures were received from 35 major internationally 
active banks across 13 jurisdictions. Data on EAD were received from 37 banks across 17 
jurisdictions. Information was also gathered during meetings with representatives from a 
subgroup of banks that submitted data and via a survey of supervisors.”). 
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sample period.92  However, for the same period, the study did not find 
similar alignment between average LGD estimates and actual loss rates.93  
It also said the results were mixed relative to average EAD estimates and 
loss outcomes.94  Again, the BCBS concluded there were material 
practice–based variations, relative to PD, LGD, and EAD, which would 
benefit from potential policy initiatives.95    
Highlighting the extreme complexity of RWA calculations,96 the 
BCBS listed several policy initiatives, targeting technical aspects of the 
calculations, to harmonize banks’ modeling with best–practice risk 
measurement standards.97  For example, the BCBS suggested it could 
develop a “[b]etter definition around what is meant by ‘long–run average’ 
with respect to PD estimation and acceptable methodologies and data with 
which to calibrate to these long–run averages.”98  It also said that RWA 
outcome consistency could benefit from more guidance on rating systems 
that banks should use in PD estimates, e.g. the use of systems oriented to 
point–in–time (“PIT”) or through the cycle (“TTC”) estimates.99  
Additionally, the BCBS determined that better informing banks about 
what is considered a “downturn” and providing guidance as to what to do 
when reference data sets do not include stress period observations could 
improve banks’ calculations.100  Further, it identified opportunity to 
harmonize differences in banks’ treatments of recovery estimates for loans 
in the process of collection within the LGD estimation process, which 
could reduce unwarranted variation.101  The BCBS also determined that 
practice–based RWA variability could benefit from harmonizing discount 
rates banks apply to recovery cash flows.102  Relative to estimation of 
EADs, the BCBS stated that clarifying data censoring techniques—
                                                                                                             
92 Id. at 2–3 (expressing criticism that few banks provided data going back more than 
five years). 
93 Id. at 3. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 2–3, 21–23 (noting severe data limitations in the study and highlighting 
discussions with bank participants as informing the more significant sources of practice–
based RWA variation in these portfolios). 
96 Lesle & Avramova, supra note 37, at 21. 
97 Regulatory Consistency 2016, supra note 90, at 22–23. 
98 Id. 
99 Id.; see also Jesus Alan Elizondo Flores, et al., Financial Stability Institute 2010 
Award Winning Paper, Regulatory Use of System–Wide Estimations of PD, LGD and EAD, 
BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS: FINANCIAL STABILITY INSTITUTE 5 (Sept. 2010), 
http://www.bis.org/fsi/awp2010.pdf (commenting that “system–wide PIT estimations of 
PD consistently underestimate and overestimate the observed default rates . . . in 
respectively lower and higher risk segments of the economic cycle”). 
100 Regulatory Consistency 2016, supra note 90, at 22. 
101 Id. at 22–23. 
102 Id. at 22. 
112 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:95 
 
removing data at the extremes or applying floors and caps to data—would 
reduce practice–based calculation differences.103 
Focusing on overall reliability, the BCBS suggested it could provide 
more guidance about model validation techniques, such as directing that 
models be recalibrated if they produce “large and persistent gaps between 
actual defaults, actual loss experience, and IRB estimates.”104  In the 
absence of the BCBS being able to assess the adequacy of banks’ 
calculations because of shortcomings in the data it received, it suggested 
that model validation could assist in confirming the appropriateness of 
model calculations when supervisory oversight affirms their 
effectiveness.105   Model validation should prompt banks to recalibrate 
when necessary even if their modeling practices fail to identify the need. 
In March 2016, because of its continued findings of excessive 
variation in RWA calculations, the BCBS proposed changes to reduce 
complexity and improve comparability by imposing various floors and 
limiting the range of practices relative to model input parameters for loan 
portfolios where IRB would remain an option.106  As discussed supra in 
part I, responses to the consultative document, predominately from 
European banks, were critical.107 
                                                                                                             
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 22–23. 
105 See id. at 22–23, 36–39 (“Harmonisation in the area of model validation could 
ultimately lead to reductions in practice–based RWA variation.”). 
106 Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Bank for Int’l Settlements, Consultative 
Document: Reducing Variation in Credit Risk–Weighted Assets—Constraints on the Use 
of Internal Model Approaches, at 1, 7 (2016) [hereinafter Reducing Variation], 
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d362.pdf (“One of the lessons from the financial crisis is that 
not all credit risk exposures are capable of being modelled sufficiently reliably or 
consistently for use in determining regulatory capital requirements.”). 
107 Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Comments received on the “Reducing 
variation in credit risk–weighted assets – constraints on the use of internal model 
approaches – consultative document”, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS [hereinafter 
Comments on Reducing Variation], https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/comments/
d362/overview.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2017) (listing comments from 73 individual 
responders—one comment is duplicative—following the BCBS’ release of the consultative 
document on March 24, 2016, inviting comments by June 24, 2016); see e.g., Position 
Paper of European Association of Public Banks, at 1 (June 24, 2016), http://www.
bis.org/bcbs/publ/comments/d362/eaopb.pdf (“reject[ing] the suggested removal of IRBA 
for certain portfolios as this would lead to a dramatic reduction in risk sensitivity of 
regulatory capital requirements and could cause faulty signalling in banks as well as a 
destabilisation of the financial system”). 
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B. The Banking Industry View of Risk Sensitivity and Variation in 
RWAs 
European banks are at a disadvantage relative to the changes the 
BCBS has proposed for RWA calculations because EU banks engage more 
than U.S. banks in direct lending with less opportunity to provide services 
requiring less capital, such as U.S. banks enjoy.108  Because the BCBS’ 
proposed changes in the RWA calculations affect direct lending, and banks 
believe they increase capital requirements for direct lending, the changes 
disproportionately affect EU banks.109   Nearly all banks responding to the 
BCBS’ March 2016 proposal, however, objected strongly to the BCBS’s 
proposed move toward standardization of RWA calculations and to the 
limitations it proposed on the use of internal models for calculating 
RWAs.110  Industry representatives also responded to the BCBS 
consultative document,111 raising concerns about the proposed changes’ 
adverse impact on availability of credit at reasonable costs to industry.112 
                                                                                                             
108 Briefing 2017, supra note 1, at 10–11 (commenting that “in the United States large 
corporates rely less on bank credit [because of other market alternatives] and residential 
mortgages exposures are offloaded to federal agencies”). 
109 Id. at 10–11 (explaining that EU banks hold more exposures on their books than U.S. 
banks where alternatives exist such as selling loans to government agencies). 
110 See generally Comments on Reducing Variation, supra note 107; see, e.g., European 
Banking Federation Comment, supra note 53, at 4 (stating “we disagree on the use of 
parameter floors and the proposed restrictions on the use of internal model for certain 
portfolios,” arguing that variability in RWAs is desirable and reflective of differences in 
market and portfolio characteristics among other factors and noting that regulatory and 
industry sources have established that most unwarranted variation is due to differences in 
interpretation of the requirements of the IRB approach or due to choices allowed within 
the approach). 
111 See, e.g., Comment from the GdW Bundesverband deutscher Wohnungs–und 
Immobilienunternehmen e.V. to Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Bank for Int’l 
Settlements, at 1 (June 2016) [hereinafter GdW Comment], https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/
comments/d362/gbdwui.pdf (representing the German real estate industry). 
112 See generally id. (disagreeing with proposed restrictions on the IRB approach, and 
commenting that the BCBS’ proposed changes will lead to a deterioration in financing 
terms for loans secured by real estate); see also Letter from Aviation Working Group to 
Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Bank for Int’l Settlements, at 3 (June 21, 2016), 
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/comments/d362/aviationworking.pdf (citing harm to . . . the 
air transport sector, on account of specialised lending becoming economically less 
attractive”). 
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While some responses were very brief in summarizing objections,113 
others referenced empirical evidence,114 and some provided detailed 
explanations for their positions—including one that attached a full–blown 
consulting study supporting the accuracy and credibility of bank 
calculations under the existing model–based approach for specialized 
lending.115  The leasing company submitting the consulting study argued 
that specialized lending such as leasing should not be subjected to the 
BCBS’s proposed floors for calculating RWAs because their study 
affirmed the asset class’s lower risk, and the proposed changes would 
unjustifiably increase capital levels for this asset class.116 
In fact, similar to the leasing company’s expressed concern, many of 
the comment letters equated the BCBS’s proposal with significant 
increases in bank capital requirements resulting from an undesirable loss 
of risk–sensitivity.117  Consequently, banks argued that the proposed 
changes would adversely affect the cost and availability of credit and 
hinder economic growth.118 In addition, some bank commenters argued 
                                                                                                             
113 See, e.g., Letter from the Czech Banking Association to Basel Comm. on Banking 
Supervision, Bank for Int’l Settlements, at 1–2 (June 24, 2016) (providing a two–page 
response suggesting that output floors be applied at the institution level rather than at more 
granular levels and requesting clarification on certain aspects of the proposal), 
https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/comments/d362/czechbankingass.pdf; see also Letter from 
Wirawat Panthawangkun, Chairman, Basel Club, to Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, 
Bank for Int’l Settlements, at 1–2 (June 24, 2016), https://www.bis.org/bcbs/
publ/comments/d362/baselclubthaila.pdf (providing a two–page response asserting the 
importance of maintaining risk sensitivity). 
114 See Letter from Lars Rohde, Bd. of Governors, Danmarks Nationalbank, to Basel 
Comm. on Banking Supervision, Bank for Int’l Settlements, at 1–4 (June 24, 2016), 
https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/comments/d362/danmarksnationa.pdf (providing empirical 
data for Danish banks’ low risk and losses relative to retail mortgages, and asserting that 
Danish banks’ LGDs are low relative to other countries because of structural factors 
allowing for easy and fast foreclosure rather than longer foreclosure processes that produce 
higher losses). 
115 Letter from Leon Dhaene, Dir. Gen., Leaseurope, to Basel Comm. on Banking 
Supervision, Bank for Int’l Settlements, at 1–4 (June 24, 2016), https://www.bis.org/bcbs/
publ/comments/d362/leaseurope.pdf (commenting that their experience is that credit risk 
models have been reliable, citing the supervisory authorities’ years of investment in 
controlling and validating the models and referencing the Deloitte research they attached 
demonstrating that leasing LGDs are significantly lower than the proposed floors). 
116 Id. 
117 See generally Comments on Reducing Variation, supra note 107; see, e.g., Letter from 
Hans Lindberg & Maria Nilsson, Swedish Bankers’ Ass’n, to Basel Comm. on Banking 
Supervision, Bank for Int’l Settlements, at 2–3 (June 23, 2016), https://www.bis.org/
bcbs/publ/comments/d362/swedishbankersa.pdf (noting that large corporates “are 
generally regarded as lower risk than portfolios with high default frequencies,” and 
asserting these loans should not be subjected to a less risk–sensitive treatment that is likely 
to result in much higher capital requirements). 
118 See, e.g., Letter from Simon Hills, British Bankers Ass’n, to Basel Comm. on Banking 
Supervision, Bank for Int’l Settlements, at 3 (June, 2016) [hereinafter British Bankers 
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that the proposed changes’ imposition of higher capital requirements 
would increase overall systemic risk by driving low risk borrowers to seek 
better pricing in the unregulated shadow–banking sector.119 
Banks also complained in their responses that the proposal’s move 
toward a less risk–sensitive framework disjoins banks’ risk management 
processes from regulatory capital requirements.120  In addition to the 
significant existing investment in systems, some banks argued that 
disconnecting internal risk management from the regulatory capital 
framework discourages further investment in risk management techniques 
and will lower the quality of risk management practices.121  Hoping to 
mitigate this outcome, a few banks proposed alternatives, which would 
preserve use of existing risk management systems tied to capital 
requirements and protect the significant investments at the same time.122 
                                                                                                             
Letter], https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/comments/d362/britishbankersa.pdf (stating that 
many of its members consider that the new requirements are “likely to result in increased 
capital requirements” and noting the possible adverse consequences of such to economic 
growth); see also Letter from David Wagner, Exec. Managing Dir., The Clearing House 
Ass’n L.L.C., to the Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Bank for Int’l Settlements, at 
10–11 (June 24, 2016) [hereinafter Letter from The Clearing House], 
https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/comments/d362/theclearinghous.pdf (citing authority for 
the proposition that “imposing overly high capital requirements on banks harms the global 
economy by limiting access to financing and liquidity”). 
119 See generally Comments on Reducing Variation, supra note 107; British Bankers 
Ass’n Letter, supra note 118, at 3 (commenting that “these proposals may drive some 
businesses to other areas of financial services, such as insurance and ‘shadow banking,’ 
some of which may be outside the current scope of prudential supervision and oversight”). 
120 See generally Comments on Reducing Variation, supra note 107; see, e.g., Letter from 
Mark E. White, Senior Vice President & Head Enterprise Risk, Bank of Montreal, to 
William Coen, Secretary, Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Bank for Int’l 
Settlements, at 2 (June 26, 2016) [hereinafter Letter from Bank of Montreal], 
https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/comments/d362/bmofinancialgro.pdf (stating that “[e]ven 
where this will not increase capital, . . . the industry generally prefers model restrictions 
that do not interfere with risk management practices – e.g. if LGDs for an asset class are 
considered too variable and some banks appear to have unreasonably low LGDs, rather 
than flooring LGDs, the better intervention is to require a minimum RWA as it will better 
support the continuation of existing risk management and parameter discovery practices”). 
121 See generally Comments on Reducing Variation, supra note 107; see, e.g., Letter from 
Japanese Bankers Ass’n to Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Bank for Int’l 
Settlements, at 5 (June 26, 2016), https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/comments/d362/
japanesebankers.pdf (stating that the BCBS proposal will “disincentivise banks from 
enhancing their risk management practices and could lead ultimately to deterioration in the 
level of risk management at banks” and further commenting that “the BCBS appears to 
excessively focus on comparability and simplicity and does not sufficiently consider risk 
sensitivity”). 
122 See Letter from Hedwige Nuyens, Managing Director, & Debbie Crossman, Chair of 
the Prudential Supervision Working Grp., Int’l Banking Fed’n, to the Basel Comm. on 
Banking Supervision, Bank for Int’l Settlements, at 3 (June 26, 2016), https://www.
bis.org/bcbs/publ/comments/d362/ibfed.pdf (“More guidance on definitions such as 
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Additionally, commenters frequently argued that the loss of risk–
sensitivity could cause banks to take more risk to increase expected 
returns.123  Some observed that this change could result in herd effects 
leading to greater systemic risks.124 
While the controversy surrounding the benefits of model–based 
regulation’s risk sensitivity versus the downside of complexity are not 
new, commenters seemed genuinely surprised by the BCBS’s proposal to 
restrict the use of internal models and by the magnitude of the proposed 
changes.125  Due to their surprise, some commenters included strong 
                                                                                                             
recognition of default, length of LGD recovery periods, LGD discount rates, and required 
conservatism for sources of uncertainty in combination with well–informed floors would 
reduce RWA variability, thereby supporting the retention of the A–IRB approach for most 
risk classes . . . permitting banks to continue leveraging their A–IRB infrastructure where 
important investments have been made including those related to risk management 
capabilities.”); see also Letter from Bank of Montreal, supra note 121, at 2 (“better 
intervention is to require a minimum RWA as it will better support the continuation of 
existing risk management and parameter discovery practices”). 
123 See, e.g., Letter from Italian Banking Ass’n to Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, 
Bank for Int’l Settlements, at 4–5 (June 24, 2016), https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/
comments/d362/italianbankinga.pdf (noting increased standardization at the expense of 
risk sensitivity causes banks to prefer to finance risker and more profitable counterparties 
given a flat cost of capital and “encourage[s] so–called herd behavior amongst banks . . . 
to invest in the same types of assets characterized by relatively low capital absorption, 
therefore potentially amplifying systemic risk in the event of crisis”). 
124 Id.; Joint Letter from David Strongin, Exec. Dir., Glob. Fin. Mkt. Ass’n, et al., to 
Stefan Ingves, Chairman, Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Bank for Int’l 
Settlements, at 7 (June 21, 2016), https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/comments/d362/giij.pdf 
(“The less risk sensitive the framework is, the more opportunities for regulatory arbitrage 
are created, incentivising firms to seek higher risk assets as a means of boosting returns . . . 
[causing] herd effects, leading to less diversity in banks’ portfolios . . . [with] a 
corresponding increase in risk in the financial system as a whole.”). 
125 Letter from Roselyne Renel, Glob. Head, Standard Chartered, to Secretariat, Basel 
Comm. on Banking Supervision, Bank for Int’l Settlements, at 3 (June 20, 2016), 
https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/comments/d362/standardcharter.pdf (“The proposals 
represent the most fundamental set of changes to the calculation of risk–weighted assets 
since Basel II, therefore should be subject to the same level of consultation and analysis; 
by way of comparison Basel II took 7 years and involved many consultations and 5 
quantitative impact studies.”); Letter from The Clearing House, supra note 118, at 5 (“[I]n 
advance of finalizing and evaluating the cumulative impact of [the many] revisions to the 
Basel III capital framework, the Basel Committee is now attempting to layer the proposed 
Standardized Approach–based constraints onto the calculation of risk–weighted assets 
under the A–IRB Approach as set forth in the Consultation . . . [without providing] banking 
organizations, market participants or other interested parties with any meaningful 
opportunity to holistically review and comment on the entirety of the Basel Committee’s 
revisions in the same manner afforded during the Basel II and Basel III processes . . . [and] 
without the benefit of considering the potential cumulative effects of the various proposals 
in the aggregate.”). 
2017] UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW 117 
 
language in their responses.126  For example, the French Banking 
Federation said, “[w]e warn that the Committee should not hastily validate 
a change of this magnitude without proper time for consensus building, 
iterations between jurisdictions and with the industry, and proper impact 
studies.”127 
Arguing for retaining the existing model–based approaches, several 
commenters argued that the BCBS should pursue better supervision of 
models and allow time for harmonization of IRB estimation practices to 
achieve a reduction in RWA variability.128  Some banks specifically 
identified the current efforts of the European Banking Authority to 
harmonize calculations and reduce unwarranted variability.129 
A couple of commenters requested that the BCBS recognize, when 
addressing RWA variability, that there are different business models and 
supervisory environments with legitimately different risk 
characteristics.130  Thus, they argue that it is desirable to retain RWA 
variability because it reflects actual differences in the riskiness of bank 
assets stemming from variations in operating environments.131 
                                                                                                             
126 See e.g., Letter from Doris Ma, Sec’y, The Hong Kong Association of Banks to Basel 
Comm. on Banking Supervision, Bank for Int’l Settlements, at 4 (June 24, 2016), 
[hereinafter Letter from The Hong Kong Ass’n of Banks], http://www.bis.org/bcbs/
publ/comments/d362/hkaob.pdf (“[I]n terms of the timeline, we understand the Basel 
Committee’s ambition to finalise requirements by the end of 2016; but would caution that 
the suite of regulatory change underway . . . is far–reaching in nature and represent a 
fundamental change to the entire regulatory capital framework.”). 
127 Comment from French Banking Fed’n to Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Bank 
for Int’l Settlements, at 1, 5–6 (June 24, 2016) [hereinafter Letter from French Banking 
Fed’n], https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/comments/d362/frenchbankingfe.pdf. 
128 See Comments on Reducing Variation, supra note 107; see, e.g., Letter from The 
Hong Kong Ass’n of Banks, supra note 126, at 2–3 (“[T]he objective of reducing 
variability of risk weights should be fundamentally addressed via harmonising key 
modelling input definitions such as default, down–turn, data sufficiency criteria, etc.[,] . . . 
and providing more specific guidance and clarifications issued by supervisors instead of 
introducing output floors.”). 
129 See generally Comments on Reducing Variation, supra note 107; see, e.g., Letter from 
French Banking Fed’n, supra note 127, at 3 (“[T]remendous efforts have been made and 
are underway by the European Banking Authority (EBA) through its benchmarking 
exercises and multiple consultations . . . leading models and parameters calculations to 
converge, hence to more comparability and less undue variability.”). 
130 See generally Comments on Reducing Variation, supra note 107; see, e.g., Letter from 
Canadian Bankers Ass’n, supra note 5, at 2–3 (“[T]here are several fundamental reasons 
for variation in RWA – differences in modelling choices and data inputs, supervisory 
guidance across jurisdictions, and differences in business strategy, systemic risk, products, 
transaction/customer risk and risk management practices.” “[S]ome divergence in practices 
in measuring RWA should be reasonably expected as homogeneous risk weights result in 
even greater and undesirable systemic risk.”). 
131 Letter from Canadian Bankers Ass’n, supra note 5, at 2–3. 
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There were also technical observations in the comment letters 
expressing concern about categories of loans that would unjustifiably 
receive less favorable treatment under the proposed changes, which could 
be useful for the BCBS to consider in finalizing standards.132  For example, 
American Express, while expressing full support for the BCBS proposal, 
requested a broader definition for “transactors”—those considered lower 
risk because they essentially pay their debt off monthly—in order to 
preclude an overly conservative RWA calculation resulting in higher 
capital requirements.133 
The table below summarizes commenters’ main observations and 
criticisms: 
                                                                                                             
132 See generally Comments on Reducing Variation, supra note 107; see e.g., Letter from 
The Hong Kong Ass’n of Banks, supra note 126, at 3 (“For instance, the provision of trade 
finance, which is especially important to SMEs and in emerging markets, will suffer from 
the introduction of Exposure at Default (EAD) floors and limitations on the determination 
of the Maturity (M) parameter, as well as the reversal of Bank exposures to the 
Standardised Approach as some of the common trade finance products such as letters of 
credit are treated as exposures to banks / FIs.”). 
133 Letter from Jeffrey Campbell, Exec. Vice President & Chief Fin. Officer, American 
Express Co., to Secretariat, Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Bank for Int’l 
Settlements, at 4–5 (June 24, 2016), https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/comments/d362/
americanexpress.pdf. 
Comment 
Number of 
Commenters 
Percentage of 
Commenters 
1) Criticism that becoming less risk 
sensitive by  mandating floors for 
losses rather than using actual loss 
history has one or more of the 
following adverse consequences: a) 
creates opportunity for regulatory 
arbitrage whereby banks take more 
risk to increase expected returns, b) 
increases costs for relatively lower 
risk borrowers by driving them to 
the unregulated shadow–banking 
market, which increases systemic 
risk, and/or c) disjoins banks’ risk 
management processes from 
regulatory capital requirements 
creating inefficiencies and 
disincentives to invest further in 
advanced risk management 
techniques. 61 84% 
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*Many more may be inferred to hold this belief.134 
                                                                                                             
134 See Appendix for bank comment listing; see generally Comments on Reducing 
Variation, supra note 107. 
2) Assertion that change is 
unnecessary because shortcomings 
in existing modeling techniques may 
be addressed by the BCBS through 
a) harmonizing supervisory and 
modelling practices, including the 
provision of more parameter 
definitions to ensure modeling 
consistency, and/or b) taking account 
of benchmarking and stress testing 
exercises, which produce valuable 
data for capital adequacy 
assessment. 43 59% 
3) Concern expressed as to treatment 
of large corporates including a) 
treating subsidiaries equivalent to its 
parent, b) providing thresholds for 
differentiating treatment of 
corporates based on their size 
without justification for the 
threshold, and c) eliminating the use 
of internal rankings for non–public 
obligors does not recognize 
operating differences between 
jurisdictions, and an alternative 
solution whereby data is pooled 
among creditors would be 
preferable. 37 51% 
4) Criticism that considerably more 
lead time is necessary for 
implementation of changes*. 22 30% 
5) Observation that model changes 
need to be coordinated with 
accounting standards to reduce 
reporting complexity and dual 
bookkeeping. 15 21% 
6) Generally, expressed support for 
the BCBS proposal. 5 7% 
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In contrast to the banks’ emphasis on risk sensitivity, Finance Watch, 
an independent non–profit public interest association, submitted a 
comment letter arguing for the BCBS to continue to move toward greater 
standardization and simplicity stating: 
At present, banks enjoy a significant degree of freedom in 
the design of regulatory risk models, which allows them 
to arbitrage capital weights to reduce capital and expand 
leverage.  Therefore, we welcome also the BCBS’s aim to 
review the structure of the regulatory framework 
including considerations of the costs and benefits of 
basing regulatory capital on banks’ internal models and 
alternative approaches to determining regulatory capital.  
Bearing in mind the shortcomings of internal models, 
arising mostly from model uncertainty, complexity and 
regulatory arbitrage, Finance Watch is convinced that the 
regulatory framework should not rely on them as a 
major . . . indicator of capital.135 
IV. ALTERNATIVES FOR RWA CALCULATIONS 
“It may be that the ultimate aim of a framework that is both simple 
and risk sensitive is unachievable.”136 
 
The BCBS noted its intention in July 2013 to retain risk–sensitivity 
while simplifying the capital framework by constraining the use of internal 
models.137  Despite this long–standing declaration, there are responses to 
                                                                                                             
135 Letter from Fin. Watch to Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Bank for Int’l 
Settlements, at 2 (June 24, 2016), https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/comments/d362/
financewatch.pdf. 
136 David Strachan, Bank Capital Regulation | Where Next for the Good Ship Basel?, 
Deloitte Fin. Servs.’: UK Blog (Nov. 30, 2015), http://blogs.deloitte.co.uk/financial
services/2015/11/bank-capital-regulation-where-next-for-the-good-ship-basel.html 
(arguing for regulators to pull back from pushing the proposed model changes on banks at 
a time when political branches are focused on the economy, and to “persist with the current 
standardised approach to credit risk”); Kevin Clarke & Roozbeh Alavi, First Take: Five 
Key Points from Basel’s Proposed Restrictions on Internal Models for Credit Risk, PwC 
(Apr. 1, 2016), http://www.pwc.com/us/en/financial-services/regulatory-services/
publications/assets/basel-models-credit-risk-march-2016.pdf (stating that banks should 
improve their standardized approach to calculating regulatory capital noting that “[t]he 
Basel proposal does not completely prohibit the use of IRB approaches, but nevertheless 
foreshadows the eventual phase–out of internal models for regulatory capital 
calculations”). 
137 See Regulatory Framework, supra note 71, at 18 (“While the introduction of capital 
floors may blunt the incentive to develop internal models, banks will still need to develop 
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the March 2016 consultative document,138 which demonstrate that banks 
around the world were not prepared for the changes the BCBS proposed.139   
Banks and regulators frame the issue as one of risk–sensitivity versus 
complexity, and alternatives seem limited to whether or not regulations 
will allow internal estimates to drive the risk weights that determine capital 
requirements.  Given that choice, the regulatory arguments regarding the 
benefits of simplicity seem to outweigh the banks’ arguments for risk–
sensitivity, which are heavily connected to opposition to higher capital 
requirements.  The evidence from various regulatory and expert studies 
suggests, inter alia, that model complexity—in its pursuit of risk 
measurement accuracy—imposes excessive costs on society, creates 
undue challenges to regulatory oversight, and prevents transparency with 
respect to the investing public seeking to understand relative differences 
in risk among the banks. 
However, some experts argue that the issue of risk–based modeling 
needs to be viewed from a broader perspective—that of financial stability.  
They favor much higher standardized capital levels,140 which might 
actually ensure that banks only exceed their “capital on average once in a 
thousand years.”141  As one example, the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Minneapolis proposes raising the largest banks’ common equity capital 
levels to a 23.5 percent ratio arguing that the benefits outweigh the costs.142 
Eliminating a risk–based framework in favor of a simple and large 
capital level requirement would nullify RWA calculations and resolve the 
variability issues and debate.143  However, it is unlikely that regulators will 
                                                                                                             
models for their own risk management and pricing purposes: regulation should not be the 
sole justification for the development of models by banks.”). 
138 See generally Reducing Variation, supra note 106. 
139 See generally Comments on Reducing Variation, supra note 107; see, e.g., Letter from 
French Banking Fed’n, supra note 127, at 1 (“We are doubtful that such a major change be 
warranted, nor that it could realistically be decided in the short timeframe left for the 
finalization of the proposed framework due for end 2016.”). 
140 See, e.g., Schooner, supra note 26, at 342–44, 350. 
141 See Basel II IRB, supra note 34, at 7. 
142 FED. RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS 9TH DIST., THE MINNEAPOLIS PLAN TO END TOO 
BIG TO FAIL, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 4 (2016), https://www.minneapolisfed.org/
~/media/files/publications/studies/endingtbtf/the-minneapolis-plan/the-minneapolis-plan-
to-end-too-big-to-fail-2016.pdf?la=en (commenting that requiring “[the largest] banks to 
issue common equity equal to 23.5 percent of risk–weighted assets, with a corresponding 
leverage ratio of 15 percent . . . maximizes the net benefits to society from higher capital 
levels . . . [by] substantially [reducing] the chance of public bailouts relative to current 
regulations from 67 percent to 39 percent . . . at a relatively low cost of gross domestic 
product (GDP).”). 
143 Letter from The Clearing House, supra note 118, at 11 (asserting that “standardized 
measures require standardized categories, [and] they inevitably involve the collapse of 
assets with widely varying risk profiles into a single category assigned a single risk 
measure”). 
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move to such a simple, high level of capital mandate in the near term, even 
if it is the best public policy and could be implemented over a significant 
period of time to avoid any possibility of disruptive economic effects.  It 
is unlikely for several reasons.  First, the BCBS provided assurances about 
not raising aggregate capital levels.144  Second, U.S. politics has shifted 
toward banks’ perspectives on regulation as evidenced by the Chairman of 
the House Financial Services Committee proposing to undo provisions of 
the Dodd–Frank Act.145  Third, the EU Commission recently commented 
that action is needed to reduce undue regulatory burden as it pertains to 
financing the economy.146 
Perhaps an alternative to the IRB approach, in the shorter term, is to 
further improve granularity under the existing standardized approach for 
calculating RWAs.147  While leaving for another day the very important 
issue of adequate minimum levels of bank capital, this approach would 
retain some risk–sensitivity in the capital framework while simplifying 
calculations.148  Some banks suggest that internal risk models could inform 
decisions regarding an asset’s assignment to a risk category within the 
standardized approach.149  The benefit of preserving use of the internal 
                                                                                                             
144 See generally Reducing Variation, supra note 106. 
145 Caroline Bradley, An Unsafe Financial System, JOTWELL (Dec. 6, 2016) (reviewing 
Anat R. Admati, It Takes a Village to Maintain a Dangerous Financial System, in Just 
Financial Markets? Finance in a Just Society (Lisa Herzog ed., forthcoming 2017)), 
http://corp.jotwell.com/an-unsafe-financial-system (“These developments imply 
something of a slide back to pre–crisis thinking.”); accord Geoffrey Smith, Read the Full 
Cease and Desist Letter a Senior Congressman Just Sent to Janet Yellen, Fortune Finance, 
Feb. 3, 2017, http://fortune.com/2017/02/03/read-the-full-cease-and-desist-letter-a-senior-
congressman-just-sent-to-janet-yellen/ (attaching a letter from a vice–chairman on the 
House Financial Services Committee to Janet Yellen stating that “[i]t is incumbent upon 
all regulators to support the U.S. economy, and scrutinize international agreements that are 
killing American jobs”). 
146 Bradley, supra note 145; see also Huw Jones, Regulators to delay meeting in bid to 
reach bank capital deal, THOMSON REUTERS (Aug. 2, 2017, 6:53 AM), http://www.
nydailynews.com/newswires/news/business/regulators-delay-meeting-bid-reach-bank-
capital-deal-article-1.3377932 (indicating that European banks’ opposition is having an 
impact because “[b]anking regulators will postpone their next meeting in another bid to 
agree on global capital rules, taking more time to try to overcome objections from European 
banks to minimum capital levels”); but see Mohamed A. El–Erian, There’s Still Too Much 
Risk in the Financial System, BLOOMBERG VIEW (Aug. 10, 2017 1:00 AM EDT), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-08-10/there-s-still-too-much-risk-in-the-
financial-system (warning against complacency). 
147 Letter from Canadian Bankers Ass’n, supra note 5, at 4 (“In the event . . . the 
Committee proceeds with its proposal to require the standardized approach . . . we 
recommend more granularity in the risk weight buckets than is proposed in the Revised 
Standardised approach . . . [and] [r]isk weights could also be mapped to the Bank’s internal 
ratings.”). 
148 Id. 
149 E.g., id. 
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models for this purpose is that it maintains incentive to continue enhancing 
these models, including the quality of the data that serves as input to them. 
And, banks may have a point about the benefits of continued investments 
in analytics.150  A February 2016 IFC Working Paper suggested that 
central banks should engage in defining a framework for the potential use 
of big data to inform policy decisions, and an important source of data for 
central banks would be from individual banks.151 
V. CONCLUSION 
“Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?”152 
 
While the minimum level of capital required to ensure financial 
stability is desperately in need of greater attention, politics do not presently 
favor increasing bank capital.  With nearly a decade having passed, 
memory of the last financial crisis appears to be fading.  Further, financial 
stability, the ultimate purpose for capital, is not well served by arguments 
that debate whether models can accurately predict the current capital 
requirements at a six, seven, eight, nine, or even ten percent level of risk–
weighted assets.  The levels of capital being discussed appear much too 
low on their face to provide an adequate cushion when confronted with 
periods of economic stress.  However, one of the failings of the current 
system is that internal models had not proved their veracity prior to use.  
Also, in coming to the decision to simplify, the BCBS noted several times 
that the data banks used in modeling did not incorporate data for periods 
of significant downturn. 
Perhaps a more objective approach for reconciling modeling, RWA 
calculations, and capital risk management is for the BCBS to undertake an 
overall study of capital adequacy that would achieve the objective of 
                                                                                                             
150 Retail Banks and Big Data: Big Data as the Key to Better Risk Management, THE 
ECON. INTELLIGENCE UNIT 4–5 (2014), http://www.eiuperspectives.economist.com/sites/
default/files/RetailBanksandBigData%20%281%29.pdf (noting that bankers surveyed 
believe credit risk is an area of great potential for big data and its tools to impact 
improvement in risk management). 
151 Per Nymand–Andersen, Big Data: The Hunt for Timely Insights and Decision 
Certainty 6, 15 (IFC, Working Papers No. 14, 2016), http://www.bis.org/ifc/publ/
ifcwork14.pdf (“As the mandates of many central banks have been extended to cover, in 
particular, financial stability and banking supervision in addition to monetary policy, . . . 
the scope for using ‘big data’ as a source of relevant information [may have] increased . . . 
to [help] detect trends and turning points within the economy, thereby providing 
supplementary and more timely information compared to the “traditional” toolkit of central 
banks.”). 
152 LEWIS CAROLL, ALICE’S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND 53 (150th Anniversary ed., 
Princeton University Press 2015) (1897). 
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minimizing tail risk—the risk of inadequate capital during a crisis—to no 
more than once every thousand years.  A more risk–sensitive standardized 
approach for calculating RWAs could align with such a benchmark study 
to achieve the financial stability objective.  As suggested by some of the 
bank comment letters, banks could use their models for calculating where 
assets would fall within the standardized approach, calculate their RWAs 
based upon more finely gradated risk categories, and thus determine their 
capital requirements while maintaining a link to their risk management 
processes.  Such an approach would also provide simplicity for easing 
oversight and comparability concerns of regulators and investors.  
Additionally, considering the continued evolution of technology and 
advanced analytics using big data, there appears to be merit in maintaining 
a role for banks’ internal models.  As noted, banks and banking supervisors 
have significant investment in credit risk modeling techniques, which are 
also linked to banks’ risk management practices.  These investments 
include validation of the models’ outputs as well as validation of the data 
inputs.  While perhaps in need of further enhancement to fully incorporate 
tail risk, refined models, and the data input to them, could provide useful 
information to central banks for managing risk beyond the institutional 
level. 
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APPENDIX 
# Entity Name Keys 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 ABN–AMRO 1,2,3,4,5 ✓ ✓ ✓  
2 American Express 2,3,4,6  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
3 Asian Bankers 
Association 
1,2,5 ✓ ✓ ✓  
4 Association 
Francaise des 
Sociétés Financiéres 
1,2,3,4 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  
5 Australian Bankers’ 
Association 
1,2,3,4 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  
6 Austrian Economic 
Chamber, Division 
Bank and Insurance 
1,2,3,4,5 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  
7 Aviation Working 
Group 
1,2,4 ✓ ✓ ✓  
8 Bangkok Bank 1,3,5 ✓ ✓ ✓  
9 The Banking 
Association of South 
Africa 
1,2,4 ✓ ✓ ✓  
10 Barclays 1,2,3,4 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  
11 Basel Club Thailand 1 ✓  
12 Berneunion n/a   
13 BMO Financial 
Group 
1,2 ✓ ✓  
14 British Bankers 
Association 
1,2,3,4 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  
15 British Property 
Federation 
1,2 ✓ ✓  
16 Building Societies 
Association (UK) 
1,2,4 ✓ ✓ ✓  
17 Bundesverband 
deutscher Banken 
1,2,3,4,5 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  
18 Canadian Bankers 
Association 
1,2,3,4 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  
19 China Banking 
Association 
3  ✓  
20 Commercial Real 
Estate Finance 
Council 
1 ✓  
21 Credit Benchmark 2,3  ✓ ✓  
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22 Credit Suisse 1,3 ✓ ✓  
23 Customer Owned 
Banking Association 
6  ✓ 
24 Czech Banking 
Association 
n/a  
25 Danish Bankers 
Association et al 
1,2,3 ✓ ✓ ✓  
26 Danish Ministry of 
Business and 
Growth 
1,3 ✓ ✓  
27 Danmarks 
Nationalbank 
1 ✓  
28 DBS Bank 1,3 ✓ ✓  
29 Deutsche Bank 1,2,3 ✓ ✓ ✓  
30 Deutsches 
Aktieninstitut 
1,3 ✓ ✓  
31 Dutch Banking 
Association 
1,2,3,4,5 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  
32 EU Federation for 
the Factoring and 
Commercial Finance 
Industry 
1,3 ✓ ✓  
33 Eurofinas 1,2 ✓ ✓  
34 European 
Association of 
Cooperative Banks 
1,2,4,5 ✓ ✓  ✓ ✓  
35 European 
Association of 
Public Banks 
1,2,3 ✓ ✓ ✓  
36 European Banking 
Federation 
1,2,3,4,5 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  
37 European 
Community 
Shipowners 
Association 
1 ✓  
38 European Federation 
ofBuilding Societies 
1,2,3 ✓ ✓ ✓  
39 European Mortgage 
Federation–
European Covered 
Bond Council 
1,2 ✓ ✓  
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40 Federation of 
German Industries 
1 ✓  
41 Finance Watch 2,3,6 ✓ ✓ ✓ 
42 Finanstilsynet and 
Norges Bank 
6 ✓ 
43 French Banking 
Federation 
1,2,3,4,5 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  
44 GdW 
Bundesverband dt. 
Wohnungs– und 
Immobilienunterneh
men 
1 ✓  
45 Genworth Financial n/a  
46 GFMA – ISDA – 
IACPM – JFMC 
1,2,3,4 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  
47 Hong Kong 
Association of 
Banks 
1,2,3,4 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  
48 IBFed 1,2,3,4,5 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  
49 ICC – BAFT 1,3 ✓ ✓  
50 IIF 1,2,3,4,5 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  
51 International Trade 
and Forfaiting 
Association 
n/a  
52 iRuiz Consulting 1 ✓  
53 Italian Banking 
Association 
1,2,3 ✓ ✓ ✓  
54 Japanese Bankers 
Association 
1,2,3,4 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  
55 Leaseurope 1,2,3 ✓ ✓ ✓  
56 Lloyds Banking 
Group 
1,2 ✓ ✓  
57 Malayan Banking 
Berhad 
1,2,5 ✓ ✓ ✓  
58 Nicholas CL Beale 
and Michael B. 
Thiessen 
n/a  
59 Rabo AgriFinance 1 ✓  
60 Rabobank 1,2 ✓ ✓  
61 Radley and 
Associates 
1 ✓  
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62 Rail Working Group 1,5 ✓ ✓  
63 Standard Chartered 
Bank 
1 ✓  
64 State Street 1 ✓  
65 Swedish Bankers 
Association 
1,2,3 ✓ ✓ ✓  
66 The Clearing House 1,2,5 ✓ ✓  ✓  
67 Tomasz Wersocki 1 ✓  
68 U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce 
1,2,3 ✓ ✓ ✓  
69 UBS 1,2 ✓ ✓  
70 United Overseas 
Bank Limited 
1,2,3,4 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓   
71 World Council of 
Credit Unions 
6   ✓ 
72 WSBI–ESBG 1,2,3,5 ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓  
73 ZIA German 
Property Federation 
1 ✓      
 Totals: 61 43 37 22 15 5 
 
